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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Shaver appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, challenging the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. The district court erred in concluding Mr. Shaver was not seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution when a police officer
requested his driver’s license in a consensual encounter, and retained that license in order to run
a warrants check. Prior to running the warrants check, the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Shaver had committed a traffic violation or other criminal offense. His
seizure was thus unlawful and the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress should be
reversed.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officers Langan and Lopez were on routine patrol in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, when they
observed a truck parked in a parking area of a boat launch at 1:10 a.m. (R., pp.112-14; 8/10/17
Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.12.) The officers pulled into the parking area and parked their patrol car
approximately 20 to 25 feet away from the truck. (R., pp.113-14; 8/10/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11.)
Officer Langan turned on the patrol car’s spotlight, pointing it towards the truck. (R., pp.11314.) Officer Langan testified this was “a welfare check.” (8/10/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.21-23.)
Officer Langan approached the truck from the driver’s side; Officer Lopez approached
the truck from the passenger’s side. (R., p.113.) Both the driver and the passenger appeared to
be asleep. (R., p.114; 8/10/17 Tr., p.24, Ls.8-10.) Officer Langan asked the driver, Mr. Shaver,
what he was doing there, and he said he was with his girlfriend; they were celebrating their
anniversary and had gone to sleep. (R., pp.113-14; 8/10/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.12-20.) Officer Langan
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asked Mr. Shaver for identification and Mr. Shaver provided his driver’s license to him.
(R., pp.113-14.)

The female passenger provided her identification to Officer Lopez upon

request. (R., pp.113-14; 8/10/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.13-17.)
As found by the district court, Officer Langan then “ran both occupants’ identification
through dispatch to make sure they were clear of warrants and to verify their identities.”
(R., p.113.) The district court found that while running the warrants check, Officer Langan
noticed Mr. Shaver was 30 years old, and the female passenger was 17 years old. (R., p.113;
8/10/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-22.) Officer Langan testified he had concerns at that point based on
Mr. Shaver’s statement that he and the passenger had been celebrating an anniversary.
(R., p.114; 8/10/17 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-17.) Officer Langan returned to the truck and advised Officer
Lopez of the driver’s and passenger’s ages. (R., p.115.) Officer Lopez questioned the driver and
the passenger about their relationship, believing he was investigating possible sexual contact
with a minor. (R., p.115; 8/10/17 Tr., p.28, L.19 – p.29, L.2.)
Officer Lopez asked Mr. Shaver “for consent to search his vehicle to prove he had not
had sexual contact with the female.” (R., p.115; 8/10/17 Tr., p.29, Ls.15-20.) Mr. Shaver
responded, “I give you consent to search my vehicle.” (R., p.115; 8/10/17 Tr., p.29, Ls.21-23.)
Officer Lopez first searched Mr. Shaver’s coat, and then searched inside the truck. (R., pp.11516.) He observed a large bag containing several small plastic baggies. (R., p.116.) He also
observed an unzipped bag with what appeared be a bong inside. (R., p.116.) Officer Lopez
asked Mr. Shaver about the bong, and Mr. Shaver said the officer did not have consent to search
that bag. (R., p.116.)
Mr. Shaver was charged by Information with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.73-75.) Mr. Shaver filed a motion
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to suppress arguing he was seized without reasonable suspicion; his seizure was unlawfully
prolonged; and his consent to search was invalid. (R., pp.98-99, 102-09.) Following a hearing,
the district court denied Mr. Shaver’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.112-24.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Shaver entered into an agreement
with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia and an amended charge of felony possession of a controlled substance, reserving
his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., pp.125, 128-40;

10/5/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.6-16, p.6, Ls.5-18.) The district court accepted Mr. Shaver’s conditional
guilty plea. (10/5/17 Tr., p.8, L.22 – p.9, L.3.) For the felony, the district court sentenced
Mr. Shaver to a unified term of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, and then
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for two years. (2/22/18 Tr., p.14, L.23 –
p.15, L.7.) For the misdemeanor, the district court sentenced Mr. Shaver to a 20-day term of
incarceration, with credit for 20 days served. (Id.) The judgment of conviction was entered on
February 22, 2018, and Mr. Shaver filed a timely notice of appeal on March 6, 2018.
(R., pp.157-69.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Shaver’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Shaver’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded Mr. Shaver was “not seized within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment” when Officer Langan requested his driver’s license, and then retained that license
to run a warrants check. (R., p.121.) The district court erred. Mr. Shaver was seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Langan retained his driver’s license to run a
warrants check, as he was not free to leave. The seizure violated Mr. Shaver’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment because the encounter was consensual at that point, and Officer Langan
lacked reasonable suspicion for the seizure prior to running the warrants check.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).

C.

Mr. Shaver Was Seized Within The Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment When Officer
Langan Retained His Driver’s License In Order To Run A Warrants Check
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
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seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Counsel for Mr. Shaver argued at the suppression hearing that
Mr. Shaver was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he provided his
driver’s license to Officer Langan because he was not free to leave at that point. (8/10/17
Tr., p.39, Ls.15-24, p.40, Ls.17-18, p.41, Ls.3-5.) The State all but conceded that Mr. Shaver
was seized when Officer Langan requested his license. The prosecutor said, “And then [Officer
Langan] asked immediately for the driver’s license. We aren’t saying—the State is not saying
that this is not a seizure or detention at that point.” (8/10/17 Tr., p.43, Ls.21-.24.) The
prosecutor argued, however, that the detention was not illegal because “[t]he time period is very
short.” (8/10/17 Tr., p.46, Ls.19-20.) Counsel for Mr. Shaver argued in response that “invoking
the community care-taking function does not give carte blanche authority to . . . make what is
clearly a seizure . . . .” (8/10/17 Tr., p.47, Ls.14-17.)
The district court concluded Mr. Shaver was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment until after the warrants check, and the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity at that point. (R., pp.118-121.) The district court glossed over the critical point in this
encounter—the point when Officer Langan retained Mr. Shaver’s license to run a warrants
check. It was at this point that the encounter transformed from a consensual encounter into a
seizure. The district court relied on State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 862 (Ct. App. 2012), but that
case is inapposite. (R., pp.118-121.)
In Randle, the defendant argued the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
because he “was seized when the officer parked behind [his] vehicle, left the patrol car’s
headlights on, approached [his] vehicle, and knocked on the window.” 152 Idaho at 864. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that under established case law, “police have the right to
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approach a parked vehicle and ask the occupants questions, even if no obvious criminal activity
is afoot.” Id. at 865-66 (citations omitted). The Court explained:
After . . . review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter
between Randle and the officer, we conclude that, when the officer parked behind
Randle’s vehicle, left the patrol car’s headlights on, approached Randle’s vehicle
and knocked on the window, such conduct would not have communicated to a
reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty to ignore the officer’s presence
and go about his or her business.
Id. at 866. But Randle did not involve a request for, and retention of, a driver’s license.
Mr. Shaver does not contend he was seized when the officers parked their patrol car in the
parking area of the boat launch, turned on their spotlight, and questioned Mr. Shaver and the
passenger. Rather, the seizure came later, when Officer Langan requested Mr. Shaver’s license,
and then retained that license for the purpose of running a warrants check. Randle is factually
distinguishable, and does not control the result here.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that even a brief stop may be
considered a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Brignoni–
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment
applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest.” Id. at 878 (citations omitted). Idaho courts have held on multiple occasions
that the retention of a driver’s license constitutes a seizure. See State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho
717, 721 (2017) (holding the detention of a driver’s license amounts to a seizure); State v. Page,
140 Idaho 841, 844 (2004) (“This Court has previously held that a limited detention does occur
when an officer retains a driver’s license or other paperwork of value”); State v. Zapata-Reyes,
144 Idaho 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2007) (agreeing with the district court that defendant was seized
“because a seizure occurs when an officer secures the driver’s license and runs his or her name
through dispatch to check for outstanding warrants”). Mr. Shaver was seized within the meaning

7

of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Langan retained his license for the purpose of running a
warrants check. As discussed below, that seizure was unlawful.

D.

Mr. Shaver’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated When He Was Seized Because
The Officers Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity At The Time Of
The Seizure
When Officer Langan retained Mr. Shaver’s license for the purpose of running a warrants

check, he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Shaver had committed a traffic
violation or other criminal offense. As found by the district court, it was not until Officer
Langan ran the warrants check that he noticed Mr. Shaver’s age and the age of the passenger.
(R., p.113.) Mr. Shaver acknowledges that once Officer Langan noticed his age and the age of
the passenger, he had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain him and investigate
further.1 However, a seizure must be justified at each and every point in order to be lawful. See
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (noting a person “may not be detained even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so”). Mr. Shaver was seized when
Officer Langan retained his license to run a warrant’s check, and that seizure violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment as it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 2

1

Mr. Shaver also acknowledges that if he had been stopped in a traffic stop, the officers could
have run a warrants check as an ordinary inquiry in such a stop. See Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015).
2
The district court noted the officers’ testimony differed regarding when Mr. Shaver’s license
was returned to him. (R., p.116.) Officer Langan testified he could not recall whether he
returned Mr. Shaver’s license to him. (8/10/17 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-15.) Officer Lopez was asked on
cross-examination, “At any time prior to Mr. Shaver’s arrest, was [his] license returned to him?”
(8/10/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.20-21.) He answered, “Not that I recall.” (8/10/17 Tr., p.33, L.22.) The
district court did not make a finding with respect to whether Mr. Shaver’s license was returned to
him before his arrest, concluding the question was “not crucial to the determination of the
defendant’s motion . . . .” (R., p.117.) Mr. Shaver agrees the question is not determinative. It is
significant only that his license was retained for the purpose of running a warrants check.
8

In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that
“except in those situation in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a
motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an
occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law, stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 663. Under the reasoning of Prouse,
Officer Langan’s seizure of Mr. Shaver in the absence of reasonable suspicion violated
Mr. Shaver’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. The facts of this police encounter, which was
consensual at the outset, did not justify a demand for, and retention of, Mr. Shaver’s license to
run a warrants check. See State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 496 (1992) (McDevitt, J., specially
concurring).
Unlike in State v. Godwin, where the Idaho Supreme Court held a warrants check of the
defendant was permissible where the defendant was not stopped by the police, but had
voluntarily pulled over on a remote highway to wait for a motorist who had been lawfully
stopped, the present case concerns an instance of unfettered police discretion. 3 121 Idaho at 496.
Officers Langan and Lopez decided to investigate Mr. Shaver’s lawfully parked vehicle with no
meaningful factual predicate for their inquiry, and then requested and retained Mr. Shaver’s
license for the purpose of running a warrants check. The district court should have granted
Mr. Shaver’s motion and suppressed the evidence found in Mr. Shaver’s truck as fruit of the

3

Moreover, there is some indication Godwin may have been wrongly decided. The Godwin
majority relied principally on a decision from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, State v.
Ellenbrecker, 464 N.W.2d 427 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). See Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493-96
(discussing Ellenbrecker). In a recent decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court “questioned
whether Ellenbrecker was properly decided” but “decline[d] to address that specific issue as it
[was] not dispositive.” State v. Smith, 905 N.W.2d 353, 363 n.14 (Wis. 2018).
9

poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 846 (2004).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Shaver respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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